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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on a new kind of policy model, called "demand-driven programs" by
which poor rural communities are allowed to choose the project they want most from a wide
set of project options. Demand-driven programs emerged as a reaction against the
traditional supply-driven programs, where the government decides what and where to invest.
Demand-driven programs claim to be better than supply driven on a number of counts.
I focused my analysis on one of its basic claims: that demand-driven programs allow poor
communities to choose what they need. While studying how communities made their
decisions, I found that this claim was not an accurate picture of the way in which
communities actually make their decisions. Basically, I found that in a significant number of
project selection cases, communities were not making their decisions driven by an
examination of their own needs and preferences, but by the influence of other actors, such as
state government, local government politicians and private firms. I call this phenomenon
"supply-driven demand," to distinguish it from community-driven demand that the model
expects. This thesis focuses on the analysis of this phenomenon. Specifically, I will present
how and why state government, local government and private firms were able to influence
community demand; and reflect on the roles that these three actors play in demand driven
policies.
Thesis Supervisor: Judith Tendler
7Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, bureaucrats and politicians have decided what kidnd of development
programs to implement and where. They used to decide, for instance, if a rural development
program would consist of providing irrigation kits or tractors or rural infrastructure, or all of
these, and if it would be implemented in municipality x or in regiony. This policymaking
model was called supply-driven because it was government who decided what was the
solution for a problem (irrigation, tractors, etc.) and, then, "supplied" this solution to the
target population. The underlying assumption was that government knew what was best for
its population. This assumption has been strongly challenged.
During the 1980s, international agencies and non-government organizations have
converged in criticizing the supply-driven model and its assumptions. Some of the criticisms
have been that these programs do not work well because, first, the government tends to
spend more money in the administration of the program than in reaching the poor with
benefits. Secondly, supply-driven programs often do not address the true needs of the poor
because government is too far away to know their needs and do not involve them in the
decision-making process. And thirdly, because beneficiaries don't participate and don't see
their needs represented, they lack "ownership" of the investment and don't feel committed
to maintaining it. The critics of the supply-driven model have proposed, instead, a new
policy model called "demand-driven."
In demand-driven programs it is not the government who supplies the solution to
beneficiaries' needs, but the beneficiaries' associations who select among a wide set of
8project options (irrigation, tractors, rural electrification) the one that addresses their most
pressing needs, and who "demand" from government the resources for those projects. I refer
here to community demand-driven programs, where only community organizations can
present demands. However, there are other kinds of demand-driven programs where NGOs,
local governments, and the private sector can also present project demands (Marc et al.
1995.) Throughout the text, when I use the term demand-driven I am restricting the
demand only to the community.
The advocates of demand-driven programs say they are better than supply-driven
programs on a number of counts: (i) a larger percentage of the funds reach the poor because
they go directly to them, and are not consumed by administrative payroll; (ii) because the
poor are allowed to select the projects they really want, these projects address their real
needs, and (iii) elicit their commitment to maintain them. This model has emerged and
spread forcefuilly since the late 1980s in the form of the Social Emergency/Investment
Funds-the poverty alleviation package originally designed to "ease the pains" of structural
adjustment policies, recommended and largely funded by international donors (The World
Bank, IDB, USAID), even though there are some countries who support the Funds with
their own resources (i.e., principally Mexico's PRONASOL, and to a less extent Chile's
FOSIS.)
This shift from supply to demand-driven policies represents a reduction of central
government's role in policy implementation and an increase in the role of community
groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local governments and the private sector
(Beneria and Mendoza 1995). At the same time, it imposes new roles on central government
9for which it is neither accustomed nor institutionally organized to carry out. For example,
demand-driven programs may require a multi-sectoral agency when government is organized
around sectoral agencies. Also, while government agencies are accustomed to working
around a plan, in a demand-driven program they have to learn to deal with the uncertainty of
how many project demands they will have to attend.
In spite of the advantages the demand-driven model claims to have and its increasing
spread throughout the developing world, there has been little research done on how this
model works in practice-how projects are selected, what impacts they have, etc.-and
whether their claims have solid grounds. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to filling
in this research vacuum by assessing through a case study some of these claims. But, before
going on to that, I will briefly present the basic features of the program I studied.
The Case
My case study is the Reformulated PAPP-Programa de Apoio ao Pequeno
Produtor--,1 a demand-driven program being implemented in the state of Ceara, Northeast
Brazil, since June 1993. The Reformulated PAPP has been implemented in the nine
northeast states plus in the Minas Gerais drought area, and, although the guidelines were
the same for all of states, there have been important differences between them in the
implementation. Although I describe the program more extensively in the ntxt chapter, let
me give a quick picture of it: (i) it is a matching-grant program funded with a loan from the
World Bank (US$ 78 million) plus state government and community counterparts-although
the cost-sharing arrangements vary according to the type of project, in average it is 60%
'Known in English under the acronym of Reformulated NRDP-Northeast Rural Development Program.
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WB, 30% state government and 10% beneficiaries; (ii) it covers 176 municipalities out ox
the 184 of the state of Ceara; (iii) rural community organizations have to select the project
they prefer from more than a hundred project options (see Annex 2), broadly classified as
productive (e.g., tractors), infrastructure (e.g., water supply) and social (e.g., day-care
centers); (iv) project costs cannot exceed US$ 40,000 (v) for project design, community
organizations can contract private or public firms; (vi) projects are approved by the
Technical Unit at the state government level, and there are two ways for screening
proposals: in general proposals are screened by the Technical Unit--called PAC, and as a
pilot project, in some municipalities, the proposals are screened by a Municipal Council
formed with representatives from the political and civic society-called FUMAC; (vii)
between June 1993 and December 1995, almost 1,780 community projects were presented;
1,449 approved; 1,165 implemented; and a total of US$ 9.7 million disbursed.
Thesis
The reasons for designing the R-PAPP as a demand-driven program were similar :o
the usual claims discussed above. While doing my field-work in Ceara, I focused my analysis
on one of the basic claims of the model: that demand-driven programs allow poor
communities to choose what they need. While studying how communities made their
decisions, I found that this claim was not an accurate picture of the way in which
communities actually make their decisions. Basically, I found that in a significant number of
project selection cases, communities were not making their decisions driven by an
examination of their own needs and preferences, but by the influence of other actors, such as
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state government, local government politicians and private firms. I call this phenomenon
"supply-driven demand," to distinguish it from community-driven demand that the model
expects. This thesis focuses on the analysis of this phenomenon. Specifically, I will present
how and why state government, local government and private firmns were able to influence
community demand; and reflect on the roles that these three actors play in demand driven
policies. What are the conditions that allow for processes of supply-driven demand? What
policy lessons can be learned to enable communities to choose autonomously?
Methodology
I conducted my field work in two stages. The basic field material came from my stay
in Ceara during a three-month period--from June to August 1995. Then, in December,
1995, I spent three weeks traveling through two other northeast states-Bahia and
Pernambuco-as a research assistant to a consultant contracted to do an evaluation of the R-
PAPP in the whole northeast.
In Ceara, I spent one month in the state capital and the other two months in the
region of Iguatu, which comprises 13 municipalities with a total population of 282,731
inhabitants (see Annex 3.) Because I wanted to have a deep understanding of the context
and characteristics of the municipality where projects were being implemented, I did
extensive field work in three municipalities--Iguatu, Jucas and Quixelo (which have a
population of 112,750 inhabitants). However, I was also interested in understanding some
of the big differences with the other ten municipalities (such as the lack of demand in some
of the latter) and, thus, I also gathered information about most of the other ten
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municipalities-interviewing community leaders and extension agents of these municipalities,
as well as key informants with knowledge of the whole region, particularly the staff of the R-
PAPP's Office for the region of Iguatu.
I chose these three municipalities because they presented similarities and contrasts
that were interesting for a comparative analysis. The three municipalities: (i) had different
degrees of community demand--Iguatu the largest in the state (79 projects); and Jucas (23
projects) and Quixelo medium (16 projects); (ii) had different political contexts, with cases
of mayors strongly interested and very active in promoting development (particularly Jucas
and to a lesser extent Iguatu), and another case (Quixelo) of a mayor with the old political
style with little interest in promoting development; (iii) one had a Municipal Council, was a
FUMAC (Jucas), and the other two were PAC.
I used my field work in the states of Bahia and Pernambuco to gain a broader picture
of the factors affecting the performance of a demand-driven program. Looking for
differences and similarities between these two cases and Ceara, and trying to understand the
reasons for this, helped me to make some of my Ceara findings more generalizable, to limit
other findings to Ceara, and to understand new things that I hadn't seen or were not so clear
in Ceara.
I collected the data through interviews; reviews of programmatic, evaluation and
monitoring reports; and analysis of secondary information and programmatic data. I have
also read the main literature on the subject. In total, in the states of Ceara, Pernambuco and
Bahia, I conducted 165 interviews, and visited 45 communities from 17 municipalities (see
Annex 1.) In the countryside, I interviewed 92 community leaders and residents, 8 rural
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extension agents, 5 project design firms, 3 regional state officials, 5 mayors, 6 local
government's officials, 2 councilmen, and 2 state deputies. I also sat in on many community
associations meetings and Municipal Council meetings. In the state's capital, I interviewed
13 high and middle officials currently and previously involved in the R-PAPP, 9 officials
from state secretaries (Planning Secretary, Social Action Secretary), and 1 federal legislator.
I also interviewed World Bank staff related to the Program in Washington D.C., and in the
Regional Office in Recife.
The order and contents of the thesis are the following. In Chapter 2, I describe the
state's context, and present the main assumptions implicit in the design of the program. In
the following three chapters, I analyze, using the case of the Reformulated PAPP, how three
different types of actors have affected community project choices: (i) state government-
chapter 3; (ii) local government-chapter 4; and (iii) private firms-chapter 5. In the final
chapter, I present the thesis' conclusions.
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Chapter 2
ORIGIN AND PROMISE
In this chapter I, describe, first, the main socio-economic and political features of the state of
Ceara; and then analyze the main assumptions about the role of government (state and
local), market and civic society that are implicit in the design of the Reformulated PAPP.
2.1. The Context
Ceara is one of the nine states of Brazil's Northeast, a region considered to be the
single largest area of rural poverty in Latin America (The World Bank 1995.) With a land
area of 146,817 km2, Ceara is roughly the size of Uruguay and has twice the population of
that country, 6.4 million (IPLANCE 1994.) Of the 2.2 million people (34.6%) who live in
the rural areas, 66.2% (1990) families fall below the official poverty line (IPLANCE 1994,
IPEA 1993) and 83% of the heads of households earns one minimum wage or less (IBGE
1991.) In the rural areas, the adult illiteracy rate is 59%, 73% of the heads of households
have less than one year of schooling, and 3% of households have running water (IBGE
1991.)
Widespread rural poverty stems from "three major interrelated causes: recurrent
droughts, low agricultural productivity and a highly unequal distribution of land" (Damiani
1993.) Negative agro-climatic conditions, such as irregular rainfalls and periodical severe
droughts, plus a poor natural resource base of the semi-arid zone have been major
constraints to increase agricultural productivity. An example of the effects droughts can
have is the 47.2% decline in agricultural output that resulted from the 1993 drought (World
15
Bank 1995.) Despite the fact that agriculture has constituted the traditional basis of the
state's economy and that it accounts for one third of the labor workforce (IPLANCE 1994),
the agricultural sector has been steadily declining as a share of the state's GDP. In 1994, the
Gross Agricultural Product comprised only 8.5% of the state's GDP, even less than the
already small 14% in 1991 (IPLANCE 1992 & 1994.) The skewed access to land is another
cause of rural poverty and low productivity. The few large landowners, who raise
predominantly cattle, are not interested in increasing productivity because " they own large
areas of land and can make up for low productivity by the low inputs (and risks) of raising
beef cattle exclusively on natural pastures" (CEPA 1986 cited by Damiani 1993.) Small
farmers, in turn, are constrained by a number of factors: "insecure tenancy arrangements that
stifled the adoption of productivity-increasing practices" (Tendler 1996), and lack of access
to modem technology and adequate working capital.
Politically, this is a context characterized by long-standing patterns of paternalistic
and clientelistic politics, "where subordinates are accustomed to obtaining (meager) benefits
as 'favors' from elite patrons with whom they have a personal relationship of clientship or
dependency [And where] the elites, in turn, are accustomed to distributing favors and
benefiting from that distribution" (Kottak 1994.)
2.2. The New Political Economy of Development Programs
Since 1973, the federal and northeast state governments of Brazil have implemented
several programs to promote rural development and alleviate rural poverty in the region.
The Reformulated PAPP is the last policy experiment. Even though the word
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"Reformulated" in the program's name suggests certain continuity with respect to the
previous program, the fact is that the Reformulated PAPP represents a radical shift
regarding the type of policy intervention that has been tried for two decades in the Northeast
region. It shifted from a rural development program to a rural poverty alleviation one, and
from a supply-driven approach to a demand-driven one. In other words, from an integrated
rural development model to a Social Fund one.
This double shift is a phenomenon that it is happening not only in Brazil's northeast,
but also in many countries of the developing world, through the programs known as Social
Funds.2 In the sections that follow, I will present the main features of the R-PAPP, showing
how they respond to the criticisms made to the old model, and outlining the assumptions
about why the new model should work well.
A Change in the Goals of Development Policy
One of the most significant changes involved in the adoption of the R-PAPP is the
shift in the goals of development programs from an integrated rural development (IRD)
approach to a rural poverty alleviation one. The IRD approach focused on improving the
agricultural productivity of small farmers through an integrated provision of development
investments, ranging from roads, water and health to agricultural credit, extension, and
research and land distribution. Since 1975 and until the 1993 reformulation, the rural
2 Since the late 1980s, and at an increasing pace, the WB and other international donors (such as IDB,
USAID) have been exporting the Social Funds model to Third World countries. The WB not only invented
the Social Fund's model with the launching of the Bolivian Social Emergency Fund in 1986 but it was also
supporting, by 1993 more than 30 Social Funds in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe (World
Bank, 1994.)
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development strategies for the Northeast consisted of two generations of "integrated rural
development"-the POLONORDESTE Program (1975-84), and then PAPP (1985-93.)
The new approach focuses on improving the living conditions of the rural poor in
general (it's not limited to farmers) through small-scale infrastructure, productive and social
projects. Project options (see Annex 3 for all the options) fall within three broad categories:
productive (communal tractors, grain mills, small scale irrigation, clothes-making),
infrastructure (rural water supply services, rural electrification, pavements) and social (day-
care centers, ambulances, repairing community-owned schools.) While the previous
programs concentrated large amounts of money in certain regions involving many
municipalities, the demand-driven program involves small investments (cannot exceed US$
40,000) in one small community in a municipality. While the IRD programs were based on
loans, the R-PAPP is based on grants-communities only have to contribute in cash or in-
kind with a percentage of the project's cost (generally 10%).
The WB and other donors like to present this shift as the failure of the old
centralized, supply-driven model and the victory of the new decentralized, community-
driven one.A more convincing argument, however, has to do with a change in the policy
orientation of international donors in general. Some people argue that IRD programs failed
not because they were centralized and supply-driven, or because they were supplying the
wrong answers, but because overcoming rural poverty requires a wide array of interventions
that has been nearly impossible to support, due to its complexity and other implementation
problems (Parker 1995.) Since the late 1980s, frustrated with these results, donor agencies
have tended to withdraw from the ambitious agenda of the 1970s, failing to confront the
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challenges of rural development, and leaving a policy vacuum. Parallel to the policy vacuum
left by the failure of LRD, a new kind of model, called Social Funds, developed an increasing
popularity since the mid-1980s in donor agencies
Reducing the Role of State Government
In the history of rural development interventions in Ceara, the adoption of the Reformulated
represented represented the shift from a supply-driven approach to a demand-driven one.
One of the consequences of this is the reduction of the role of state government. In general,
the demand-driven model has attracted so much enthusiasm among the donor community
partly because it's a model of less central government. In the cases of Ceara the model tries
to reduce government's role, mainly, in two ways: (i) by excluding it from its traditional
planning role of proposing what and where to invest; and (ii) by assigning minimum
program's resources (of funding, personnel, etc.) to perform the roles to which state
government is left out with-information dissemination, project appraising and monitoring.
State government was blamed for the failure of the previous supply-driven model,
mainly because of being too much involved. The main causes stated for this failure are that
institutional arrangements were highly centralized; decision-making, administration and
financing arrangements were generally non-participatory, and the sense of project
'ownership' at both State and local levels was limited (World Bank 1995.) Also there were
problems of inter-agency coordination, and of spending a high proportion-56%--of funds
on operational costs rather than on the program beneficiaries--440/o-(Damiani 1996.)
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In the case of the R-PAPP, the government is left out with a minimum structure. The
R-PAPP is coordinated by a Technical Unit (TU), situated in the state government's
Planning Secretary (SEPLAN), which has a small staff at the state and regional level for
appraising and funding projects, and for monitoring them. All the other implementing
agencies, like the extension agency EMATER-CE, who played an important role in previous
programs were eliminated from the program.
Local Governments: Good Guys or Bad Guys?
In the supply-driven scheme prior to the R-PAPP, local governments didn't have any formal
role in program design. Including them is an innovation of the R-PAPP. However,
the role that local government should play in the R-PAPP, and in decentralized demand-
driven policies in general, appears to be one of the most controversial issues in the design of
the program. The most patent evidence of this is that by 1996 the program had put in
practice three different kind of local government's roles.
In some municipalities, the program bypasses local government and communities
present their projects directly to a regional office of the Technical Unit who does a first
appraisal and then sends the projects to the state level Technical Unit for final appraisal and
finding (called PAC-Programa de Apoio Comunitario). For a second group of
municipalities, the program have created Municipal Councils formed by representatives from
civil society and the government which only screen and (supposedly) prioritize projects for
approval, but don't have finding power (called FUMAC- Fundo Municipal de Apoio
Comunitario.) After the Council analyzes the proposals, it sends them to the Technical Unit,
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at the state level, for appraisal and fimding. The Council includes approximately 13
members, chaired by the mayor, and with representatives from the Regional Office, the rural
labor-union, the rural extension agency, the town council, the church, and local banks, and
with a majority of members from community organizations. In bothA third group is similar
to the second, but with the additional feature that each Council will administer the allocation
of an annual budget (FUMAC-P.) 3
These three different models reflect the range of feelings that donors have about
involving local governments, from the fear of LG's clientelistic use of the program (PAC),
passing to giving them some voice in decision making (FUMAC), up to trusting them with
the co-responsability for spending part of the program's budget (FUMAC-P.) The Program
started with 165 municipalities under the PAC scheme and 11 under FUMAC, as a pilot
program. During the first year and a half of the program, 15 more municipalities were
shifted from PAC to FUMAC, after the WB and state government considered it to be a
better scheme.4
Increasing the Involvement of the Private Sector
The role of the private sector changed in two important ways before and after the R-PAPP.
One is that they started to be responsible for providing technical assistance in project design,
a role the extension agency was playing before. Program guidelines specified that after
communities select the project, they could contract professionals, governmental or non-
3 While the first two schemes have been under implementation since the beginning of the program, the last
one is just starting in 1996.
4 Actually, the FUMAC component will expand more and more in the next five-year loan program that was
signed with the World Bank for the period 1996-2001, and for a loan of USS 70 million-that with the State
and beneficiaries contribution will add up to 116.7 million.
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governmental organizations to assist them in the project design The Technical Unit would
distribute to the program Regional Offices a list with firms and individuals who have
expressed interest. After selecting the project a community could contract somebody from
that list or from their own choice, who would be paid 2%5 of the project budget only if and
when the project is approved (World Bank 1993.) The other change was that in
implementation issues (selling machines; building contracts) private firms had to deal with
and were contracted by community associations instead of government.
Beneficiaries' Central Role
The rural poor is the actor that has the greatest responsability in the Reformulated PAPP.
They have to (i) select the project by themselves without technical assistance, (ii) decide
which firm to contract to design the project, (iii) administer the fiunds when the project is
approved, and (iv) contract private suppliers of goods and services to implement the project;
and, once implemented, (v) operate and maintain it. This shows that the program has shifted
not only important decision-making power to the community level, but also many
responsabilities.
Table 1 presents a scheme of the actors involved in each stage of the project cycle, for an
easier understanding of the whole project cycle.
The program guidelines set a limit of up to 8%, but in Ceara it was cut to 2%
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Table 1
Roles of Actors Involved in Each Stage of the Project
Arrnraina to Prnoam Dpeion
Cycle,
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 Stage 7 Stage 8
Information Project Approval Project Analysis Funds Project Monito-
Campaign Selection of Design & Disburse- Inple- ring
selection Apr ment mentation
Technical Implements assesses gives responsi-
unit ampaign__ &decide check ble
Regional informs check if it assesses
Coord. meets cri- & sends ibid
(RC) teria -PAC to TU
Design contracted
Firms byco
Commun. get the info. select/ select deposits only res-
Assoc. send to design check ponsible
RC firm __
Municipal informs same RC, same RC,
Council but for but for
FUMAC FUMAC
In this chapter, I presented the program design features and the assumptions involved in
them about the role of state and local government, the private sector and community
organizations. In the next chapter I will start my presentation of how this policy model
worked in practice in the case of Ceara. Particularly, I will present the first case of supply-
driven demand, analyzing how and why state government influenced community decisions.
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Chapter 3
STATE GOVERNMENT-DRIVEN DEMANDS
In this chapter, I will analyze the first case of the supply-driven demand phenomenon,
focusing on state government influence on community decision-making. First, I will examine
those cases where demands were driven by government preferences, analyzing how
government managed to exert its influence. Second, I will analyze the reasons and factors
that explain government actions and, at the same time, how these actions created some of
the key conditions that allowed other actors (mayors, town councilors, private design firms)
to drive community demand. Based on this material, I will elaborate on the relationship
between state government and demand-driven policies, suggesting alternative ways of
thinking about this relationship.
3.1. How State Government Influenced Project Choice
Although the demand-driven model tries to exclude the state government from proposing
where and in what to invest, I found two ways in which the government managed to drive
the demand. The first way was to show its preference for productive projects rather than
infrastructure or social projects. Many communities chose a productive project (say, a
tractor) instead of a non-productive one (a community center) that they wanted more,
because they knew it had higher chances of getting approved. The second way was to
exclude project options that were listed in the agreement with the WB, but that the
government didn't want to support. Energy for households was a clear example of this
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situation. Many communities wanted it but, in general, they didn't request it because they
said "you cannot choose energy, the government doesn't give for that."
The state government showed preference for productive projects, in particular
agricultural ones (input supply stores, tractors, irrigation, etc.), for two reasons. First, there
were political factors. According to TU and WB officials, the governor of the moment, Ciro
Gomes, liked the idea of a productive orientation because he saw it as politically profitable
to show concern for employment and income generating activities.
The second factor relates to the preferences of the Technical Unit's staff both at the
state and regional level, grounded in their professional background and work experience.
Most of the staff were agricultural engineers, agricultural economists and agricultural
technicians who were involved in the previous phases of the program, which focused on
improving agricultural production. Many of the top officials still regarded that goal as
central and thought it should be prioritized in the R-PAPP because it was the best way to
use public resources. Their conception of development was that it is better to help the rural
poor to generate income and employment first, and then with that increased income they
would be able to build the latrines or the water service, and maintain them without the help
of the state.
The Aggregate Result of Government Influence
State government influence explains in part the predominance of productive projects
over infrastructure and social ones, both at the state level (70% productive) and in the
Iguatu region (73% productive). This stands in sharp contrast with the northeast project
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portfolio, where only 40% of the demand was for productive projects; and with other states
like Sergipe where 15% were productive and 65% infiastructure (Damiani 1996). I
observed the same phenomenon of government influence, perhaps even more accentuated, in
the case of Bahia, where the state government was interested in micro-enterprise projects
(agro-processing, bakeries, clothes making, etc ). Furthermore, Damiani (1996) also points
out the influence of state government preferences in the cases of Sergipe and Rio Grande do
Norte.
A very concrete example of the effects of Ceara's government preference is the case
of electrification projects. Although electrification for households was an eligible project-it
appears as such in the "Beneficiaries Handbook" (DEPES 1993), the TU spread the word
that it wasn't going to approve these projects unless they were coupled to a productive use
(motors for irrigation or a manioc mill, etc). Thus, as Table 2 shows, while rural
electrification is one of the most demanded projects in the Northeast (20.3%), the influence
of Ceara's state government has reduced its significance (3.8%).
Community Demand by Type
Table 2
of Projects in Ceara and the Northeast
Ceara Northeast
n % n %
By Broad Types
Infiastructure 395 21.7 14,566 52.1
Productive 1,273 69.9 11,057 39.6
Social 152 8.4 2,314 8.3
Total 1,820 100.0 27,937 100.0
8 Most Demanded Specific Project Types in Ceara
Livestock 309 17.0 n/d -
Tractors 245 13.5 2,263 8.1
Rural Water supply 182 (1) 10.0 6,230 22.3
Agricultural Input Supply Stores 157 8.6 n/d -
Manioc Flour Mills 85 4.7 978 3.5
Rural Electrification 70 3.8 5,671 20.3
Irrigation 56 3.1 642 2.3
Clothes-making 50 2.7 447 1.6
Share oftotal demand 1,154 63.4
Projects Implemented 1,176 64.6 16,231 58.1
Source: World Bank, Recife Office 1995.
(1) includes 11 sub-types
Government's Means to Induce Demand
The government had two basic means for influencing community decisions: (i) the
information it gives communities about the program, and (ii) its power to approve projects.
The government of Ceara first showed its interest when it named the program, which
it baptized "Produce" (Produzir), highlighting only one of the three broad sectors of the
program (social, infrastructure and productive). However, probably the best means to
deliver its message was through the publicity campaign or informal contacts with those
transmitting information to communities. One brochure of the publicity campaign states:
26
27
"Given the state government's commitment to employment and income generation issues,
productiveprojects are beingprioritized" Even though this message didn't reach
communities directly because of the ineffectiveness of the publicity campaign, it did reach
the program regional offices and local actors (such as mayors, private firms, etc.) who
transmitted the information to communities, many times adding their own bias or preference.
If not through these brochures, these actors learned about the Technical Unit's preferences
through informal contacts with it. Mayors, deputies and project firms made regular visits to
the Technical Unit. Regional offices were key actors in disseminating these preferences
because they were sources of information about the program for communities and the other
actors involved. Although the regional staff made few visits to communities-it has very little
budget and 1 or 2 persons to cover an average of 14 municipalities-- many communities
(mostly from the same municipality where the office was located) and other actors visited
the office.
A second way government expressed its preferences was by approving certain types
of projects faster and in greater number. According to the program design, project appraisal
and approval would be done on a first-come, first-serve basis. However, the Technical Unit
gave priority in the analysis to productive projects (or to those that had political support-
see next chapter.) Some communities noticed this and took it into account as a factor in
deciding what project to present. For instance, sometimes a community that had presented a
latrine project earlier than another community that had presented a productive project saw
that the latter got its project first. When the former complained to the regional officer, the
common answer was: "lt'ines are not a priority because they are not productive." When
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this community presented a second project, not only did they often choose a productive one,
but they also might transmit this information to other communiies.
Although the state government showed its interest in productive projects, it did not
exclude financing some social and infrastructure projects. That's why some people who
knew about this preference still sent other types of projects. This was particularly true of
mayors, who knew that the chances of having a project approved depended also to a great
extent on their political leverage at the TU (see next chapter.)
3.2.Why State Government Influenced Community Decisions
The main argument that I will present in this section is that there were two factors that
explain why the state government influenced community decisions. The first one relates to
the way in which the government disseminated the information about the program. This also
created the conditions that allowed other actors (local government politicians and private
firms) to influence community demand-I refer to the influence of these actors in chapters 4
and 5. The second one relates to the existence of a government with a vision of the best use
of public resources that conflicted with the demand-driven model.
The Information Campaign
As I mentioned in chapter 2, one of the new roles that state governments assumed in
demand-driven programs was the dissemination of information about the program. This role
is a crucial one because if communities don't get information about the program they cannot
request a project. However, how communities get information is just as important as getting
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it. The process through which the information goes from the state government to the
thousands of communities spread all over the 176 municipalities creates the possiility for
altering the content of the message. What information is delivered? Who delivers and who
receives it? How is it delivered? These become important questions to answer.
The Failure of the Information Campaign
The program's guidelines required an information campaign that would guarantee to all the
eligible communities information about the program's"objectives, eligibility criteria and main
rules, providing simple and viable procedures to present proposals, indicating information
places, or telephones where the public could forward complaints or denunciations. The
campaign was to have a wide scope, and could be done using radio, newspapers, "carros de
som", bulletins and brochures, posters and public events in rural areas. Each State will
develop a strategy, action plan and terms of reference to contract this campaign" (see
Diretrizes... 1993.) The information campaign done by the state of Ceara did not achieve its
goal. None of the people I interviewed in the communities had known about the program
through this campaign, but rather through other channels (mayor, regional seplan, a private
firm, a deputy, a town councilor, other communities, etc.). Why was this?
Poor Design. A Political Advertisement Campaign
One of the reasons for the communication failure was that the campaign was poorly
designed. It did not select the appropriate channels. Experts in rural communication consider
radio to be a superior channel of information to TV, given that the short duration of the TV
spots (because of its high cost) makes TV a more information-poor channel than radio,
which because of its lower costs allows for deeper information. This was true in Ceara's TV
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spots for the R-PAPP, which referred to the launching of a new program for rural
communities, but only in a general and superficial way. According to the experts, the rural
poor use rae' a more than TV. Ceara's emphasis of TV over radio as the media selected to
reach the rural population is an extreme version of the error -according to Barnett (1994)
who analyzed the information campaigns implemented in the different northeast states.
Ceara had the highest television to radio budget ratio (15 to 1, or $112,060 to $8,480.)
Ceara also used many posters and small pamphlets which, as Barnett points out, contain
little information and usually only serve to provide contact information.
The reasons for this poor design are very significant. Initially, the Technical Unit was
responsible for the campaign and was going to follow through and deepen the program
guidelines scheme. However, the governor, through the Government Secretary (SEGOV),
took over this function in order to gain political credit for the start up of the program. To
design and implement the campaign, SEGOV contracted the publicity firm which does
political advertising for government. What this firm did was the same kind of work it had
been doing before for government: a political advertisement campaign instead of a deep
informational campaign that informed and enabled communities to participate in the
program.
Some Consequences of the "Less Government" Policy
Another reason for the failure of the information campaign could be traced to the lack or
underutilization of government structure, caused partly by the "less government" policy.
This had two manifestations. On the one hand, the program regional offices which had the
role of visiting communities to inform them about the program and distribute informative
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brochures didn't do it because of lack of budget and personnel. There were only one or two
technicians to cover 14 municipalities, with a small budget that didn't cover gas expenses or
car repair.
On the other hand, the state agency with the greatest experience and structure for
reaching the rnual poor-the agricultural extension agency, EMATER-CE-was not involved
in the program, partly because it was seen as part of the old model of government
intervention, from which the R-PAPP was trying to create a distance. EMATER-CE is the
only state agency with offices in each municipality, and a minimal staff Its job (whether well
or badly done) consists in visiting rural communities, and through the years extension agents
build networks of information with community leaders which could have been used to
deliver the information about the program. However, a political conflict between the
extension agency and governor Ciro Gomes, who was trying to close the agency, hindered
this possibility fom happening.
Fear of Being Overloaded by Demands
The other reason for the poor design was government's fear that if they had a deep
information campaign, government could be overloaded by demands from communities. The
same phenomenon happened in other northeast states (Barnett 1994.) That's why instead of
deepening the information campaign, it trusted other means of publicity, such as mayors, the
regional coordinators, etc. These channels, along with others such as design firms and
dealers and neighboring communities were the real channels of information. But this had a
cost. The cost was that it created the conditions for induced demand to happen.
Communities received the visit of a design firm representative who presents partial
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information about the program, pressing for a quick choice. The community is vulnerable to
this type of influence because it hasn't received information about the program from an
autonomous source. This problem of induced demand also happened in other states--see
Moreira da Silva (1994) for Maranhao, and Damiani (1996) for several northeast states.
A massive and effective information campaign is a pre-requisite for a demand-driven
program to work well. Unless communities have independent sources of information, it is
very likely that they are not going to choose the projects that address their needs. However,
at the same time, the information campaign poses specific dilemmas: to work well the
program needs to be widely publicized, but at the same time, this could allow politicians to
manipulate the program. Also, it may generate a demand so high that the TU cannot manage
with limited administrative resources.
The uncertainty that a demand-driven program generates for the actors involved
very much affects the implementation of the program. Politicians fear that they will be
overloaded by demands which they will not be ready to satisfy, and so they carry out a
general campaign which serves the purpose of political advertisement but does not allow
communities to act autonomously. They use selective means of publicity, which jeopardizes
the very nature of the program. The technicians are uncertain about whether too much
diffusion of the program will attract too much political interference, and so don't want to
disclose too much information (this happened in the case of Maranhao.)
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Induced-Demand as a Transaction Cost
The importance of the information campaign creates a transaction cost in demand-driven
programs that supply-driven ones do not have to face. The transaction consists of the state
providing the information so communities can generate a demand. The cost is represented
by the risk that opportunism enters in the transaction (a state government, a mayor or a
private firm manipulating the information) making the final product (the community's
decision) not the best product (what the community really wants) but rather one of inferior
quality. The transaction required by the R-PAPP opens the window for the opportunistic
behavior. Transactions in the supply driven model do not present this information problem
because there is only one actor (the state) which decides what to do, where and when (an
analogue of vertical-integration.)
A Tecnical Unit with a Development rsion
A second reason that explains why state government influences community choices is the
existence of a Technical Unit with a clear idea of what type of development policy has to be
implemented, which contrasts with the opennes and uncertainty of the final program profile
that exists in a demand-driven program. The existence of this conflict reveals both a dilemma
and an irony in the thinking and the practice of development policy.
The Ownership Dilemma
One of the main arguments for supporting a demand-driven model is that letting
communities choose the project they want will increase their sense of ownership of the
project, and thus, the likelihood that they will operate and maintain it successfully in the long
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run. However, those who support this argument overlook the fact that there is another kind
of ownership, government ownership, which seems to be in contradiction with community
ownership. Government ownership means that it is committed to the goals of the program,
and that it will put its energy into matking it work. The development literature has often
referred to the iack of government ownership or commitment as a cause of policy failure,
and thus, to the importance of generating government support.
The dilemma that seems to be inherent to the demand-driven model and that the R-
PAPP reveals is the contradiction between these two kinds of ownership. If the community
gains ownership(choosing the project it wants) it means that government has to give up
ownership (not choosing what it thinks is best.) A possible consequence of this tension is
that state government will try to re-gain ownership, as Ceara's government did, by defining
productive projects as the most imnpotant, or excluding household energy. In doing that, it
will undermine community ownership and the basic demand-driven principle because
communities may choose something that is not what they want most, but what they are most
likely to get.
What this shows is that the attempt of demand-driven policies to rule out
goverrment's preferences not only is difficult, because government has ways to impose its
interests, but also not necessarily very desirable, because it may turn out to be against the
basic principle of demand-driven policy. What to do then? Is it possible to take into account
government's preferences while maintaining the demand-driven scheme? An alternative
would be that the donor agency negotiates very carefully with the government responsible
for the coordination of the program, trying to come to agreeement on the sectors or projects
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options which the government wants to include in the set of eligible options. In the case of
Ceara, was that the program guidelines were negotiated with donors for the whole region,
and not individually with each state. The assumption of homogeneity of interests across
states was apparently not investigated.
Even if this problem is solved and government's preferences are better taken into
account through its participation in project design, there is still another problem. Public
sector ownership doesn't come only from participating in the design, but mostly from
participating in the implementation. This conclusion comes out in the explanation for the
better performance of the APCR component in the old PAPP vis-a-vis the other components
(Tendler 1993.) The APCR component was the only one in which the Technical Unit had
executive power, instead ofjust coordinating power. Bureaucrats, having the chance to
participate in the implementation, felt more responsible for its success, devoting more
bureaucratic energy than in other cases. The R-PAPP undermines this source of ownership
by confing government to the passive role of appraising proposals, without any possibility
of influencing the implementation process.
While in the case of the R-PAPP community and government ownership are in
contradiction, in the case of the APCR they are not. In the APCR, both technical agents and
community members had a chance to discuss their perspectives of what would be the best
project for the community, both gaining ownership in the process
The Irony and Challenge of Human Capital Formation
One of the most important positive impacts of the 20 years of supply-driven, integrated rural
development policies prior to the R-PAPP was the creation of scarce and valuable human
36
capital. This was a cadre of agricultural engineers, economists, technicians or rural
sociologists who spent years traveling through the region, dealing with the problems of how
to start a process of rural development, and gaining experience through different kinds of
interventions. Most of Ceara's Technical Unit top officials and staff were formed by this
process.
It is ironic that this valuable and scarce human capital, which should be an advantage
in a development process, could turn out to be a constraint when a demand-driven program
is adopted. As I argued before, the TU's staff resisted the demand-driven model because
they thought that it would be better to focus the program on improving income and
employment generation, and to have more public sector involvement. The sectoral expertise
may represent a barrier for implementing multi-sector policies like the Reformulated PAPP
and Social Funds in general. And it poses the challenge of finding out what kind of mix of
skills is more appropriate for these schemes and what to do when they are not available.6
In this chapter, I have discussed the first type of the supply-driven demand
phenomenon-when the demand is driven by state government's preferences. In the next
chapter, I will turn my attention to the local level, showing how local government's
influence constitute a second type of supply-driven demand.
6 I didn't have time but it also would be interesting to research what role Technical Units played in the
other states, given that they also had people with similar backgrounds to those in Ceara, but in some cases,
such as Sergipe and Pernambuco, there was an emphasis on infrastructure instead of productive projects.
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Chapter 4
LOCAL GOVERNMENT-DRIVEN DEMANDS
The role that local government should play in demand-driven policies is a
controversial issue, with several alternatives, and seemingly no easy answer. Should local
government be bypassed because anything it touches turns out to be clientelistic and
corrupt? Or, is it the opposite, that it should be included because it knows the context, has
resources and a vision to contribute to municipal development and, perhaps more
importantly, it exists to represent community demands? If it participates, which role should it
play? The R-PAPP, reflecting the difficulty of this issue, has experimented with three
different roles (which I described in chapter 2.) In one, local government is bypassed (PAC);
in a second, it participates in a Municipal Council that screens project proposals (FUMAC);
and in a third one, starting in 1996, it also participates in a Municipal Council which, aside
from screening, also approves and funds projects using a budget transferred by the program.
Although the R-PAPP is moving towards a greater local government (LG) involvement,
there is one crucial roie that other Social Funds have included7 and the R-PAPP hasn't:
allowing LG to present projects it considers crucial for the municipality; to make demands
the same way communities do.
In this chapter, I will address the issue of how LGs have dealt with being excluded in
the R-PAPP from proposing projects. I will show that in many cases they managed to get
their demands through the program by influencing the project selection process. In different
ways, LGs got some project demands to be driven more by their preferences and actions
than by community ones--a phenomenon I call local government-driven demand. LG
7 See Cisneros 1993;Goodman 1995; Marc et. al 1995.
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politicians are interested in influencing demands because the R-PAPP represents an
incredible opportunity for doing local policy (given that the money received in a municipality
through the program may largely exceed its budget for investments); and local politics. But
before analyzing why LGs are interested in influencing demand, let me show first how they
do it.
4.1. Four Disguises for Local Government-Driven Demand
LG politicians--mayors, town-councilors--managed to influence community demand so that
the community represents its preferences in four different ways: (i) proposing a project to a
community; (ii) imposing the project on the community; (iii) presenting a project through an
association not formed by the poor; and (iv) persuading communities to choose the project
LG prefers.
Proposing
This type has the following form: a mayor has a project in mind, an idea of what kind of
investment is needed in the municipality--either to install a clothes-making factory or a fish
processing factory, for example. Then, he proposes the project to one or more communities,
who may accept or reject it. I will present two examples of this.
In the municipality of Machados in Pernambuco, the mayor created the demand and
the organization. In 1995, the mayor of Machados got to know about a large national
apparel corporation (Hering) interested in installing small-garment factories in municipalities
close to the state's capital, to contract out part of its production and lower its costs.8 The
8 A detailed presentation of this agreement can be found in Damiani (1996.)
39
company would provide sewing machines and inputs, training and a commitment to buy all
the production. However, as a counterpart, the group or the government had to build the
warehouse where the small factory would function. The mayor saw this as an excellent
opportunity to attend to the growing unemployment problem that his municipality suffered.
However, the LG didn't have money to build a warehouse as Hering demanded. First, he
offered his house; but then, he found out about the R-PAPP, and decided to apply for those
funds. He asked the women of the municipality interested in the project to sign up, and then
created a community association (Associacao Comunitaria das Costureiras de Machados),
covering the costs for legalizing it, and speeding up the bureaucratic paperwork. The state
government, which was also involved in the negotiations, gave priority to the approval of
this project, which by January 1996 was finishing the training for almost 100 workers.
In this case, the mayor played a role that goes against the way in which the
community demand-driven model is designed, given that he, instead of the community,
created the organization and demanded the project. However, in a pure community driven
model this municipality wouldn't have received the benefits of this project. His role was
crucial in two ways: first, in making the contact with the private firm; second, in solving the
economic and administrative costs of creating the association (which have prevented or
delayed many communities from participating in the program.)
A second example relates to fishing projects in Jucas. In this case, the mayor had an
idea and proposed it to several communities (taking over the demand generation), who
accepted it not because it was what they wanted most but because of the greater chances of
having their projects accepted if they were supported by the mayor (persuasion.) Knowing
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through fishing experts about the great potential for fishing in the northeast interior, the
mayor's idea was to develop a set of linked fishing projects: intensive fish breeding in
"acudes" by community groups; a "fabrica de racao" to feed the fish; a factory to process
the skin of the fish and another one to process the meat in fillets and sell them. These turn
out to be four R-PAPP projects, presented by three different communities. The mayor made
an agreement with the state university and got a fishing engineer who spent a year in the
municipality discussing the projects with the communities that had accepted and designed
them.
Impming
Both in Jucas and Machados, the political conditions are more the exception than the rule.
These are "ideal" mayors, enlightened leaders committed to the development of their
municipalities. The rule in rural municipalities is a mayor who turns every government
decision in a client-patron relation aimed at giving him political or economic power. The
take-over situation under a clientelistic or corrupt mayor may look much worse. The mayor
will deal only with his captain ward, deciding, without consultation with the community
what the project demand will be. Then, when the project is approved, the mayor and the
captain ward tells the community that the project was something the mayor got for the
community. This has the opposite effect of what the R-PAPP wants to achieve--it sends the
message that community action is not needed to improve living conditions. Often, the mayor
also gets part of the project finds (the captain ward of the community gives it to him after
receiving the check) faking the receipts.
41
The fact that in the cases of Machados and Jucas the mayor's influence wasn't used
in this clientelistic and corrupted way, raises some important questions. If, on the one hand,
we agree that these cases are desirable and should be promoted in other municipalities; and,
on the other hand, that the R-PAPP at least formally doesn't allow them to happen or they
are not supposed to happen, the question then is: should the program allow a LG to present
proposals? Is it possible to think of designing a program that encourages this kind of
enlightened leaders, while not giving space to the clientelistic ones? Is this realistic?
Bypassing
Jucas provides an example of the use of an already existing association to take over
the demand generation process. A very progressive mayor, strongly committed to the
development of his municipality, is worried about a river that crosses the municipality and
that during the dry season gets dry, leaving the farmers on its banks without water. He
knows that if he can build a small "barragem" (dam) it will be possible to perennize the river
up to a certain point, but the municipal budget is already committed for other purposes. The
mayor gets to know about the R-PAPP, and decides to apply for the finds through an
association located in the municipal capital (which has less tnan 7,500 people and thus is
eligible) of which he is a member, and which is formed not by poor farmers but by a local
progressive elite. He gets the grant and implements the project, which achieved its goal.
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Pesmading
The fourth type of influence is the most subtle and indirect. In it the mayor tries to
"persuade" community associations to choose the project he/she prefers (because he thinks
it is a vital one for whatever reasons) by giving technical and political support to push for
their approval. The key difference from the other types of influence is that the mayor has to
wait for communities to be tempted, instead of contacting them directly. And some buy the
LG preference and present such project not because it is what they want most, but what
they think they are most likely to get because they can count on LG's support.
The case of Iguatu is a good illustration of this kind of situation. The mayor of
Iguatu believes that the types of project the municipality needs most are those that provide
for drinking water to each community. Potable and accessible water not only helps to
prevent diseases (in which he is very interested because he is a medical doctor), but it also
allows the LG to cut down costs of contracting private water trucks (carrospipa) that bring
water to those communities that have no access to water sources during the dry season.
Some estimates indicate that the LG spends an average of US$420 per family per year to
supply water by using water trucks (Damiani 1996.) In Iguatu, 7 water projects implemented
benefited approximately 500 families, which represented annual savings of US$210,000
(5.5% of its annual revenues), and four others were waiting for approval.
The basic channel the mayor used to persuade communities to select this project was
a Municipal Development Council (not the FUMAC) formed by community organizations
that met once every month to discuss their problems and present demands to the LG. The
mayor attended these meetings, presenting his case in favor of water projects and offering
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technical assistance (contracting a geologist) to design them for the communities that are
interested (see more related to this in next chapter.) Municipal staff also visited
communities, advocating good reasons for choosing water projects, and emphasizing that it
brings the mayor's support. In some cases, communities decide to choose water because
they see it as their most urgent problem. In other cases, this choice is the result of a strategic
calculation. They perceive that it's more likely that their projects will be approved (whatever
they are) if the mayor is interested in them, because they assume the mayor will push for
these projects in the Technical Unit.
4.2. The Driving Forces of Local Government's Influence
There are two main driving forces behind LG's influence-in any of the four ways I
presented. One relates to local policy issues and the other to local political issues.
Local Poicy & Public Finance
It is easier to understand why LGs are so interested in using R-PAPP resources if we
consider that the average number of projects received in a municipality per year could be
higher than the budget it has for investments. It is estimated that no more than 10% of a
municipality's annual revenues remain available for investment after paying salaries and
other expenditures (Damiani 1996.) In Iguatu, the R-PAPP has implemented 47 projects in
two years, which represent approximately US$1,290,8559, or US$650,000 per year. That is
more than one and a half times the amount the municipality has for investments-$400,000
or 10% of an annual revenue of approximately 4 million dollars. Jucas, has implemented 14
9 It implemented 47 projects, calculated at an average cost of US$27,465 (van Zyl et al 1995)
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projects in two years, approximately US$384,510, or US$190,000 per year; again, this is
higher than the US$150,000 it has for investments-with annual revenue around US$1.5
million.
These resources represent a great opportunity for implementing projects the mayors
perceive as key for the municipality. The examples of Machados (clothes-making) and Jucas
(dam and fishing projects) illustrate that situation well. A key debate in the local public
finance literature is whether this kind of grant transfers makes LGs invest in sectors and
projects where they were not investing before, and so the program helps to influence LG
activities; or whether its the opposite case, and LG substitutes its own funds for state
transfers, continuing with the same level of activity, with the program having no impact at all
on the local level. The examples of clothes-making in Machados and the fishing project in
Jucas show that LGs used the funds for new activities they were not doing before, and thus
there was real additionality. In the case of water in Iguatu, the fimds seemed to have been
used to substitute for something the LG had some but not enough resources to do, so there
was a sort of complementarity.
LocalPoitics
The large amount of resources available through the R-PAPP was not only an incentive for
doing local policy, but also a tremendous one for doing local politics. There are two kinds of
political uses of the program. One is the politician that fears community organizations, and
thus, tries to use the R-PAPP resources in the traditional client-patron relation, between the
captain ward and himself. The other kind of politician has the opposite view, seeing
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community organizations as a way to gain new constituencies or securing old ones, more as
an asset than a threat. Both types of politicians find a way to gain politically from the
program, and probably that is how this program works its magic-that is, how it is able to
leverage so much political support, when previous programs have faced so much political
opposition.
A quick comparison between the old and the new model may show some of the R-
PAPP's features that contribute to its political appeal. The previous program (called
subprojeto or Planejamento por Projeto) concentrated high amounts of resources in
geographically limited regions, and it was based on a regional multi-year plans, designed
with high technical input. This scheme is a political bomb for a number of reasons. One, it
creates political opposition from the mayors of the municipalities that have been excluded,
who are jealous of the resources the other mayors are getting. Two, because plans are made
with high technical criteria, those mayors with targeted municipalities find it difficult to
politically influence the decisions of which communities should be included, making the
program less politically attractive. Three, these mayors have to face the demands of those
communities that are excluded, which could be their constituencies. On the contrary, the R-
PAPP represents the dream of a politician. Almost all state municipalities are included, and it
consists of small amounts of money that could be allocated almost anywhere in the
municipality for a wide list of investments. And there are no technical agents or criteria
insulating politicians from participating. The only thing a politician has to do to gain
politically from this program is to do what he/she knows: deal with community demands
either in a democratic or clientelistic way.
46
Why Bypassing Local Government May not Prevent Clientelism
The main way in which the program has tried to prevent LGs from taking over the
community demand is through two possible institutional schemes. If the mayor was
democratic, they would use the mayor-chaired Municipal Council. If the mayor was
clientelistic, they would use the bypassing scheme, where communities can present their
demands directly to the Technical Unit. However, to be autonomous from the local political
system, communities need to have, at least, the information about the program through
autonomous sources. As I showed in the previous chapter this was not the case either in
Ceara or in the rest of the northeast states. Not only was the information campaign very
ineffective in getting the message of the program directly to beneficiaries, but also state
government's fear of being overloaded by community demands made it use mayors and
deputies as one of the principal means for distributing information. If communities get to
know the program through the mayor, they have no means for preventing themselves from
being deceived and manipulated. A good name for this phenomenon would be not a client-
driven process, but a clientelistically-driven one. A lesson to draw from this kind of situation
is that one of the conditions for successful bypassing of clientelistic LGs is to deliver
autonomous information about the program directly to communities.
The other assumption that did not work well was to think of FUMAC as the option
for democratic, open mayors. It struck me to hear the Technical Unit staff from Ceara,
Bahia, Pernambuco and Maranhao saying separately that many FUMAC municipalities were
chosen not by their democratic virtues but by a political pressures from those municipalities
interested in having it and with political leverage at the state level.
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One of the policy design factors that has worked in limiting clientelism was to make
non eligible those projects that were easier to manipulate politically. For instance, one of the
reasons why the WB decided to stop financing ambulances was because it found out that
many politicians were asking for them because it was easy to put stickers in them with their
names and political parties. This is significant because in programs like this with many little,
widely dispersed projects, it is hard to catch these cases. Even if such cases are caught, they
are often not controlled because of the political strength of the people who are involved. The
question then is what were the conditions that allowed for this control to work. A possible
answer might have to do with the fact that in this case the monitoring was set up with
different layers of checks-and-balances: regional offices of the Technical Unit transmitting
information from the field to the headquarters in the state capital, which is monitored by and
in contact with a WB office in Recife, which is located in Brazil, but not part of the Brazilian
politics because it is an external agency. The staff of the Recife office are worried about their
jobs and performing well because they will be judged by Washington. The representatives in
Washington, in turn, are very sensitive to the clientelism issue because other people in the
WB are suspicious of the program for this reason.
In this and the previous chapter, I focused on the government side of the
phenomenon of supply-driven demand. In the next chapter, I turn my attention to the market
side of this phenomenon.
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Chapter 5
MARKET-DRIVEN DEMANDS
The Reformulated PAPP also opened a space in the program that meant a greater
role for the private sector than in previous interventions, an unavoidable feature in these
times of less government and neo-liberal reforms. The role assigned to private firms in the
R-PAPP was different from the one it had in previous programs in two important aspects.
One is that they were responsible for providing technical assistance in project design, a role
the extension agency had traditionally played. The other one was that in implementation
issues (selling machines; building contracts) they were contracted by community associations
instead of government. The main advantages assigned to the private sector over the public
sector are (i) that its work is more responsive and customized to the client needs because it
faces competition pressures; (ii) that it delivers more quickly because of the incentive in
earning money; and (iii) that it tries to cut down costs to increase profits.
In this chapter I will focus on how and why private firms and dealers influenced
project choices. This will help us to think about the consequences that private sector
involvement has in the way community demand-driven programs work, and what to do
about them.
5.1. Risk-Taker & Risk-Averse Firms
In the 13 municipalities of the Iguatu region there were six firms that were
responsible for almost all the projects designed in the region. The program design specified
that only after communities have decided what project to request and the regional
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coordinator has approved this request can they contact and contract design finns. However,
in practice, what happened was that while some firms stayed at their offices waiting for
communities to come with their project selected, others saw the R-PAPP as an excellent
opportunity to earn good money quickly, and went to "generate" the demand. I will refer to
these two types of institutional behavior as risk-averse in the first case, and risk-taker in the
second one. Let me explain why.
The risk-averse firms waited for the communities to contact them not because it was
what the program specified, but because of not wanting to take risks. These are very small
firms (only one or two persons), which in some cases had other permanent jobs. For them,
adopting a more active behavior would mean hiring people to visit communities, paying
traveling expenses to them, and perhaps leaving their jobs or risking losing them. They
didn't want to make those investments because of the uncertainty of not knowing whether
and when those projects would be approved; and whether the Reformulated PAPP would
continue or be interrupted and replaced by a different program--as had happened with
previous programs (subprojetos.) Their strategy, then, was to have a low risk profile,
working through the preexisting networks that they had with communities. In one case, this
network came from having a staff member who had worked in the local cooperative
(COIGUATU), which maintained contacts with around 40 communities. In another case,
the firm had an ex-extension agent on its staff, who had developed personal relations with
some community leaders. Because of this low profile, they worked with few communities
and municipalities--at most 2 or 3 (only places were they had previous contacts.)
50
The risk-taker fins adopted an active strategy of going to the communities to
generate the demand, assuming some risks. They hired staff to visit communities, paid their
traveling expenses, and invested in infrastructure to speed up the rate of project design
(computers, the design of standardized projects, etc.) They were in a better position to take
these risks because they were stronger firms willing to expand-they had been designing
projects for a long time for large farmers, or for BNB10 funded individual loans, so they had
the basic infrastructure and capital to invest. They were lured by the possibility of making
high profits (they could get up to $800 for designing a project) but also-and perhaps more
importantly-by the institutional signals they received from the program when it was starting.
In mid 1993, when the R-PAPP began, the TU was pressured to spend some funds
before the end of the year that, otherwise, would have to return to the World Bank. The TU
managers instructed the Regional Coordinators to prioritize the presentation of projects
fiom the communities and push the project design firms to make projects quickly. As a
result, by the beginning of January 1994, the TU had received a huge quantity of projects,
without enough personnel to appraise them. Because of the pressures fhr quick
disbursement in a short period of time and with a superficial evaluation, many projects were
approved. This was the first approval and disbursement of finds by the Reformulated
PAPP. When the firms saw that without much work they were getting high returns in a short
period of time, the risk-take firms decided to invest in this and crystallized an institutional
behavior that would be difficult to change in the short term. They expanded their staff,
bought computers and developed software to standardize project presentation and became
more aggressive in generating the demand.
'0 Banco do Nordeste do Brasil
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It is no wonder that these firms had the major share of projects designed. Out of 270
projects designed for the 13 municipalities, almost 200 were done by the two risk-taker
finns, while the other 70 were done by the other four firms, and consultants brought from
the state capital by local politicians.
5.3. Choices Induced by Risk-Take Firms
If we left the story there, we could praise the market for making the program work.
Communities that had no information about the program because of the failed campaign of
the state government were finally able to request projects because of the risk-taker firms
who informed them about the program. Although this is true and important, it is not the
whole truth. An important question that completes the picture is: Did this unexpected
behavior of the risk-takers affect the nature of the community demand-driven program?
More specifically, how were project choices made when these firms designed the projects? I
will argue that the behavior of the risk-takers all too often prevented communities from
choosing those projects more related to their needs, undermining the basic purpose of the
program. In this section I will address how they did it and its results, and in the next one
what were the reasons that pushed them to do it.
As in the other two cases of state and local government-driven demands, the
asymmetry of information between communities and local firms is a crucial piece of the
story. Cormminunities did not know about the R-PAPP or had a poor understanding of it,
which allowed the firms to manipulate the presentation of the program. In general, either the
firm representative talked to the president alone or also to a group of community members,
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presenting a narrower menu of projects than the one in the program's guidelines, often in a
misleading way. For example, they would say: "There's a new government program that is
giving things to communities. You can choose a tractor, an agricultural input supply store,
or a manioc mill. Do you need a tractor?" It is easy to understand that many communities
answered "yes" to that question. Why not have a tractor if it was "for free"--the community
counterpart was paid in very few cases"--and it would help. In those communities with
personalistic, authoritarian leaders, the director of one firm acknowledged that they had to
deal with the community leader alone, who then wanted to present this as his project. Firms
also pressed for a quick decision, impeding the necessary time to assess the pros and cons of
the different alternatives. Because the traveling expenses were high (communities are distant
from one another, through difficult roads) firms asked their employees to make communities
select the project in their first visit to the community, so they didn't have to return a second
time. This picture of the project selection process is very different from the participatory one
often portrayed. A different way of describing this is saying that these projects were not
demand-driven but supply-driven demand with the suppliers being private firms instead of
government.'
The incentives that led firms to work with a limited number of project options (see
next point) explains why each firm tended to concentrate in a few types of projects. The
" The purpose of the counterpart was to increase community ownership of the project, assuming that if a
community was willing to contribute in money or in-kind, it would mean it was a project they valued and
would be interested in maintaining. When the communities could contribute in kind, for instance with the
labor for building an input supply store or a community center, I observed that in many cases they did.
However, when the contribution had to be in cash (tractors, ambulances), they never made it. This is very
significant if we consider that tractors was the second largest project demand in the region-42 projects (see
Annex 4.)
12 Constructing firms have had also a strong influence in some Social Funds in Latin America. Engineering
firms building piped-water projects in Ecuador (Steffes 1996) and schools and clinics in Honduras (Watson
1994) are some examples of this phenomenon.
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firm that designed more projects (120), had 40% of its projects of only one type (50 projects
were for agricultural input stores.) Perhaps one of the most striking examples of supply-
induced demand is the case of the latrine projects. Out of the thirteen municipalities in the
Iguatu region, four of them requested 16 latrines projects in total (see Annex 4.). In the
municipality of Ico there were 11 requests, and in the other three municipalities the other
five requests. Why so many in Ico, compared to the rest? My explanation has to do with the
firm supply induced demand. One of the risk-taker firms did 15 out of the 16 projects, had
its headquarters in Ico, and in the same week-end visited 6 communities next to each other,
informed them about the program and came out with the same project for the six
communities.
5.2. Incentives to Influence Project Choice
Why did firms influence project choice? What kind of projects were they pushing for? They
had preferences for agricultural productive projects, which are easier to standardize, without
high design costs, and which would leave them the highest net profit.
The background
According to the directors of one of the risk-taker firms, their job was the following: "We
send a technician to visit communities, he talks to the president to gather the community and
explains what the program is about, and asks what they are planting. He then engages the
community in discussion and advises them on the best option for their community." The
technician doesn't ask: "what are your needs?" but "what are you planting?" Their bias for
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agricultural productive projects probably has to do with the fact that all the staff have a
background in the agricultural field-agricultural technicians and engineers, ex-EMATERCE
agents, land surveyor. In this sense they share government's preference for agricultural
projects, which they are more capable of designing than infrastructure projects such as water
and energy.
Cheap to Design & with Highest Profit
In order to keep design costs low, firms also excluded projects with more expensive designs.
Although in principle this could sound positive, because by excluding the most expensive
projects to design they were economizing--which is a private sector virtue-in reality it
wasn't. Let me give an example. A firm in Iguatu designed at the beginning of the program
several ground water projects without a geological stuldy, some of which failed because
there was no water. After the Technical Unit started to demand geological studies previous
to the approval of water projects, this firm decided to stop designing them, so they didn't
have to incur this cost. As a result, some communities who wanted a water project, but
didn't have the money to pay for a geologist (US$150), chose another project the firm
would design (such as an agricultural supply store.) The mayor of Iguatu was interested in
water projects (see chapter 4), and so aRter a while, he started to offer free technical
assistance for these projects. 13
13 It is interesting to notice that the failure of a ground water projects-i.e. a hole is dug and there is no
water-is more rapidly visible (the money was wasted) and more clearly associated with a bad project design
(there should have been a pre-feasability study) than the failure of an agricultural supply store where if
borrowers don't return the inptts, this is seen one year later and it's not associated with the designers, but
blamed on the community (for its lack of solidarity.)
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Another type of project preferred by project design firms were those that gave them
the highest profit. Because they earned a percentage of the project budget (2%), firms were
more interested in the most expensive ones-while the cost of a tractor was around US$
30,000 (with a profit of USS 600 for the firm) the cost of a cistern was around US$ 4,600
(US$ 92 profit.) If we calculate the net profit (taking into account the time span needed for
project design), instead of the gross profit, probably the relationship won't change
significantly.
Customizing
One of the arguments for involving private firms was their comparative advantage for
customizing projects to the needs of the clients, under the basic assumptions of competition
and being more responsive to clients' pressures. Perhaps because of the lack of these
conditions and other factors-see next section-the truth is that projects were not
customized. Examples of this could be found everywhere-and not only in the risk-taker
firms but also in the risk-averse firms which frequently designed the project without going to
the community. Agricultural input projects, for instance, included the building of the store
and an initial inventory of supplies according to the local productive features (pesticides,
fertilizers, one or two irrigation pumps and tubes, tools such as shovels, etc.) There were
many projects that included an irrigation pump where there was no water for irrigation, or
more corn pesticides than needed and less rice pesticides than needed. Other examples are
electrical equipment for a manioc mill in a place without energy; or a rice husking machine
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too big for the store in which it was going to be placed. While in some cases, these mistakes
were solved, in others they weren't.
Standardization & Economies of Scale
Not only were projects often not customized, but they were also commonly standardized. I
found that risk-taker or demand-generating firms emphasized those projects that were easier
to design in terms of being amenable to standardization, and thus less time consuming. For
instance, these firms preferred agricultural supply store projects to irrigation projects. While
the former consists of'a standard plan for the building (the plan was always the same), and a
set of basic inputs (pesticides, fertilizer, tools,etc.), the latter demands a more customized
analysis of the most appropriate irrigation system (aspersion, flooding, etc.), the existing
quantity of water, etc. Firms had standardized models of several projects (tractor,
agricultural supply store, manioc mills, latrines, etc.), a form in a computer that allowed
them to design a project approximately in an hour. While the bigger firm had 8 to 10 models,
the smaller ones had 2 to 4. An extreme and perverse form of standardization was when
firms presented the same project for diferent communities. Program officials at the regional
and state level, both in Ceara and Pernambuco, acknowledged that several times they
received from the same firm the exact same project, photocopied seven or nine times for
different communities. The only difference was the name of the community and beneficiaries.
Standardization of project design is not negative in itself, if it is used to set certain
parameters that then will be adapted to the local situation.14 However, as implemented by
4 Actually, this is what the World Bank and state governments haie agreed to do in the next phase of the
program to improve project design.
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private firms in the region of Iguatu, the negative consequence was tht the economies of
scale involved in project standardization represented an incentive for design firms to induce
the demand in favor of those projects that were easier to standardize, working against the
community demand-driven nature of the program.
5.4. Government & Market Failures
Explaining why firms influenced project selection has to do not only with the motivations of
firms themselves, but also with the structure of the environment in which they developed
their strategies. Two main structural factors are the lack of market competition and of
government control.
The Lack of Market Comptiion.
In an ideal market situation, finns would spring up and compete among themselves for being
selected by communities. Trying to overcome the competition, each firm would have tried to
please communities by giving good information about all the options, or projects more
customized for community needs, etc. However, the region of Iguatu was far from an ideal
situation. There were few firms, splitting the market, and clients were poorly informed about
the options. This resulted in the worst combination: monopolistic firms with weak clients.
There were six firms, two of which visited communities. Intentionally or not, the fact is
these two firms had divided the project market. The bigger of the risk-takers worked mainly
in Iguatu (where it had its headquarters), Carius, Cedro and Jucas. The other worked in the
municipalities of Ico (headquarters), and Oros. So, communities got the visit of not more
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than one firm, which thus didn't face competition. Because communities didn't know about
other firms, they were a sort of captive client, with no opportunities to pressure firms for
good performance.
The Lack of Government Control. Government failed in two main aspects. First, it
did not provide good, non-biased information to communities that would allow them to be
aware of other firms, and of all the possible project options--I have already referred to this.
Second, it failed in monitoring two important aspects of the program. The TU didn't impose
sanctions on the firms. Although at the state and regional level, the TU staff was aware of
private firms' influence, they didn't try to control it. For instance, when they identified a
project that had not involved consultation with the community but was agreed on between
the firm and the community leader, they didn't punish the firm, banning it from continuing
designing projects. I don't know the reasons. One possibility is that there were few firms,
and banning them would have meant not having anyone to design the projects. When I was
finishing my fieldwork, the state government decided to take the firms out of the program
and bring this function back to government, saying that the firms were getting too much
money, and there was corruption between firms and regional coordination offices (given that
in my region, this didn't happen, I won't discuss it). Because of the pressures from the WB,
the governor allowed private firms to continue working, but also ordered all the government
secretaries to start designing projects for free (for which it would give special funds.)
Because I left when this problem was unfolding, I don't have a clear idea of how it was
finally settled.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis tells the stories of actors who were supposed to behave in a certain way
under the demand-driven model, but instead behaved differently. These are, then, stories of
misbehavior, though not necessarily with a negative outcome. The element in common that
they have is that they are different manifestations of the same phenomenon, that I call
supply-driven demand. Supply driven demand means that the demand, instead of being
driven by communities' preferences-as the model proposes-, is driven or strongly
influenced by the preferences of supply-side actors. In this thesis, I focus on understanding
how and why three actors-state government, local government politicians, and project
design firms-influenced community choices.
State government did this in two ways. Excluding projects it did not want to find
through the program-such as household energy-, it forced communities, who had energy as
their first and most important priority, to choose a different project they wanted less. Giving
priority for approval to certain types of projects (productive) over others (infrastructure,
social), often influenced communities that had non-productive projects as their first priority
to change to a productive project to increase their likelihood of gettting their projects
approved.
Local governments influenced project choices in four different ways, depending
partly on the mayor's political style. One way was to organize the demand-instead of
waiting for it to manifest itself-by proposing a project to a group of disorganized people,
and forming an association to work on it. A second way was similar, with the difference that
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it used an organization not fbrmed by the rural poor to present directly his project, instead of
"consulting" with the community. In a third type of situation, a mayor persuaded community
organizations to present a project of his interest, because communities thought that with his
support the chances of getting it approved were higher. Finally, there were those mayors
who imposed their preferences over community ones by coopting community leaders and
repressing community opposition.
Project design firms are the third supply-side actor which influenced community
decisions. These firms took advantage of the poor information communities had about the
program, making them choose from a set of project options which the firm preferred which
that was narrower than the eligible ones. Hiding information and pushing communities to
choose certain options, private firms prevented communities from choosing the projects they
preferred most.
These different manifestations of the supply-driven demand phenomenon show that
this is not an unidimensional phenomenon, and that it is necessary to discriminate among the
different types. While in some cases the motivation for influencing community choices
comes from a self-interested motivation with no attention to communities, as in the case of
the project design firms and clientelist mayors; in other cases, it is a legitimate interest in
using the resources in the best way possible that pushes them to influence community
choices.
At the core of the demand-driven model is the claim that the poor know better than
government what their needs are, and thus, if they are allowed to select the project, they will
choose the one that addresses their true needs. The problem is that whether this is true or
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not is very hard to determine in the cases of supply-driven demand because the poor are not
making their choices autonomously and well informed. What I have shown in this t
that allowing the poor to choose what they want is not a sufficient condition to make it
happen and that, in fact, there are considerable obstacles. Community choices are very
vulnerable to the influence of outside actors whose preferences override the ones of the
community. This vulnerability emerges from a basic asymetry of information and power that
exists between communities and the other actors. Communities have to wait for other actors
to bring the information and have less power than a mayor or a state deputy to influence the
project approval process. Increasing community autonomy in project selection calls for ways
to close or narrow down this asymetry gap.
Identifying the conditions that allowed the different forms ofthe supply-driven
demand phenomenon to occur provides some lessons on how to address the most negative
aspects of this phenomenon, and how to create the conditions that will allow true demand-
driver. processes. Probably one of the most important lessons is the crucial role of
implementing an information campaign that enables communities to know all the different
project choices and program features through autonomous sources. Complete and
autonomous information could empower communities to defend their legitimate choices
from other actors that are interested in manipulating them.
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Stats Mmld es and Com s Visited
CEARA
JuCu (FlMAC)
1.Sao Pedro
2. Sao Pedro 1, II
3. Poco Grande
4. Baixio da Donana
5. Vila Mel
6. Os Corredores
7. Canafistula
8. Varzca Paixavati
9. Sao Francisco
10. Santo Agustin
11. Angicos
12.Juazeiro Arazaiz
13. Coiguatu
14. Barro Alto
15. Santa Clara
16. Baixio dos Ferreiras
17. Alencar
18. Barrocas
19. Agua Branca
20. Santa Rosa
21. Recreio
22. Baixas
23. Antonico
24. Riacho do Meio
25. Coop. Quixelo
Interviews with technkis fro municipaites of Carus Cedro (FUMAC) Ba, o, Lavnrs da
Malgabeira
PERNAMBUCO (10)
MACHADOS: 1 assoc. corn das costureiras de machados
ITAPISSUMA: 2asoc. colonia de pescadores
CARUARU: 3 Assoc. Prod de Batatinha
SAO CAETANO: 4 Coop.
ARCOVERDE: 5 Coop.
BONITO: 6 Assoc. Prod. de Pedra do Rodeadouro; 7 Floresta
PARANATAMA: 8 Assoc. Com Bom Jesus
AFOGADOS DA INGAZEIRA (FUMAC): 9 Assoc. C. Prod de Baixio da Carapuca
FLORES: 10 Coop Agropecuarina dos produtores de Flores
BAHIA (5)
SAPEACU 1
GAVIAO 2. dois barragems
JACOBINA 3 Junco
VARZEA DO POCO: 4 Assoc. Beneficente Cultural Espotiva y Recreativa Varzeana
PIRITIBA (FUMAC), 5 Sumare.
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AIEX 2
Eligib Prie
Infrastru ct
Electrification
Rural
Urban
Rural Water Supply
cisterns
deep well
piped water
small ponds
Community Centers
Road repairs
Pavement
Sanitation
Latrines
Community Laundries
Small Bridges
Warehouses
Producltive
Commmnity Tractors & Tools
Irrigation
Mills
Manioc
Rice
Livestock
Cattle
Goats
Pork
Chicken
Bees
Microenterprises
Clothes-Making
Soap-Making
Hammocks
lSaking
Fishing
Equpment
Ship
Intensive Breeding
Sodal
Day-care centers
House-improvements
Health eqWipments
Education
Ambulances
. .. .
- - -~
-
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ANNEX 3
Selected Indicators for the Municipalities of the Iguatu Region
Uman
Baixio
Saboeiro
Canus
Lavras de
Mangabeir
a
Jucas
Quixelo
Io
Oros
Cedro
Ipaumirim
Acopiara
Iguatu
Population Renda Intema Renda per Urbanization Poverty
capita Rate
7,897
5,408
15,4461
17,393
30,751
21,104
15,955
62,650
21,193
23,289
11,295
49,307
75,691
256,971
280,332
934,440
1,362,725
2,709,876
2,569,710
2,203,721
13,993,239
5,240,651
5,598,853
3,184,883
21,196,214
62,841,090
33 33.89
52 39.13
60 35.37
78 n/a
88 47.97
35.96
n/a
n/a
64.62
n/a
46.41
36.01
70.22
122
141
231
238
244
279
430
831
Source: IPLANCE, 1994.
PROJECTS
Socited %
0 0.0(
1 0.37
9 3.33
23 8.52
2 0.74
70.5
72.0
67.0
n/a
64.3
Approved
0 0.0C
1 0.49
6 2.94
17 8.33
2 0.98
65.8
n/a
n/a
61.8
n/a
67.9
57.6
56.0
Impme %
nted
0 0.0(
1 0.6(
5 3.01
13 7.83
2 1.2C
14 8.43
13 7.83
27 16.27
16 9.64
12 7.23
2 1.20
14 8.43
47 28.31
166 100.00
23
16
39
30
22
4
22
79
270
8.52
5.93
14.44
11.11
8.15
1.48
8.15
29.26
100.00
20
14
30
23
14
2
18
57
204
9.80
6.86
14.71
11.27
6.86
0.98
8.82
27.94
100.00
^ - -~~~~~~~~~ - - - - !
-
_ 
_ _
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Annex 4
Number of Projects Demanded in Each Municipality
by Type of Project- lguatu Region
Acopiara Babdo Carius Cedro Ico Iguatu Ipeumi- Jucas Lavrasde Oros Qubeio Sabo- Unari n %
.rib . eiro
1 .Piped Water 11 1 12 4.4%
2.Acude 1 1 0.49t
3.Ambulance 1 1 0.40
4.Fishin3 Tools 3 1 10 4 18 6.70A
5.Input Supply Store 9 16 9 5 19 5 4 2 I 70 25.9%
6.Ap ra _ _ 1 1 2 0.709
7Artesanato 3 3 1.1%0
8.Arnazern 1 1 0.4%
9.Avcultura 1 1 0.4%
10.Barragern 1 1 3 1.10A
11 .Rice Processing 1 - 2 2 1 7 2.6ff
12.Benef. Rochas 1 1 0.49f
13.Cattle 2 2 0.7ff
14.Calcarnento da Rua 1 0.4f%
15.Caprinocum __ 6 6 2.2%
16.Manioc flour l 1 1 3 1 6 2.2%
17. Comm. Center4 3 1 3 1 2 1 18 6.7%f
18.Chafariz 1 1 0.4%
19.Cj.Residen - 1 2 0.7%f
_20.CI_ 1 3 t 1 6 2.2%
21.Day.care Ctr. 1 5 2 1 9 3.3ff
22.Electrification 1 1 4 6 2.2f%
23.Eng. Rapad 1 1 1 3 1.1ff
24.Sweets Fabric 2 1 3 1.1%
25.Fossas 1 1 2 0.7%
26.Warehouse I 1 0.4%
27.1nd.Racao 1 1 0.4%
28.Iriation 1 2 3 1.1%
2.Latrines 11 3 1 1 16 5.9%
3D.Comm. Laundry 1 1 0.4%
31.Brick-Making 1 1 0.4f
32.Others 1 1 1 3 1.19t
33.Bakery - 1 2 0.7%
34.Passager Molhada 1 2 1 1 5 1.90A
35.Piscicultura 1 3 3 7 2.6%
36.WaterDistrib. Network 2 2 0.7f
37.Silos 1 I 0.4%
3B.Farm Tractor 4 1 5 3 14 2 3 5 4 42 15.6%
TOTAL 22 1 23 22 39 79 4 23 2 30 16 9 0270100.0%
Source: World Bank Database, Recife Office.
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